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Individuals with a migration background represent a steadily increasing percent-
age of Germany’s population. Although the majority of individuals with migration 
background lack German citizenship and are therefore unable to vote, the number 
of naturalized immigrants continues to rise. Accordingly, political parties have been 
showing greater interest in this group of potential voters.
Data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) show that individuals with 
migration background develop diverse orientations to Germany’s political parties in 
relation to their country of origin. The effect exercised by the country of origin is still 
present after many years of residence in Germany and among the second-generation. 
A large majority of individuals from the so-called “recruitment countries”—i.e. coun-
tries from which Germany acquired workers for its booming economy in the 1950s 
and 60s; namely, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal—identify 
politically with the SPD (Germany’s mainstream labor party). By contrast, foreigners 
of German descent who have immigrated from Eastern Europe and Russia (so-called 
“Aussiedler” or “Spätaussiedler”) tend to support the CDU/CSU (Germany’s tradi-
tional conservative party alliance). Germany’s smaller political parties find relatively 
little support among immigrants and their offspring. While extremely diverse party 
identifications are witnessed among migrants depending on their country of origin, 
these differences can only be minimally attributed to social circumstances or basic 
ideological outlook. Model calculations show that eased naturalization laws would 
not provide an appreciable advantage to any single political party. 
According to the German Federal Statistical Office’s 2007 Microcensus,1 more 
than 15 million people with a migration background live in Germany. Of this 
number, 5.6 million are entitled to vote at the federal level.2 The number of fully 
franchised individuals3 with a migration background residing in Germany has 
been increased first and foremost by two groups: (1) foreign nationals of German 
descent, predominantly from Eastern Europe and Russia, who have immigrated 
1  For more information on the German Microcensus, see: http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/de-
statis/Internet/EN/Content/Statistics/Mikrozensus/Aktuell.psml
2  German Federal Statistical Office: Der Bundeswahlleiter: 5,6 Millionen Wahlberechtigte mit Migrationshintergrund. 
Press release, 2009, http://www.wahlrecht.de/doku/presse/20090911-1.htm
3  Non-German EU nationals residing in Germany are entitled to vote in municipal (as well as EU) elections, but not in 
federal ones, and therefore have a partial franchise.The Party Identification of Germany’s Immigrant Population
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Box
Data and Method
The Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) is an annual repre-
sentative survey of Germans, foreigners, and immigrants 
in the old and new German states. The survey is carried 
out by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW 
Berlin) in cooperation with “Infratest Sozialforschung.”1 
In 2008, the survey queried almost 11,000 households, 
composed of more than 20,000 individuals. The survey 
provides a rich source of data on various topics such as 
income, quality of living conditions, life satisfaction, and 
political orientation since 1984 in West Germany and 
since 1990 in East Germany. In the first survey wave in 
1984, immigrants from the former “recruitment countries” 
were overrepresented. The new immigrants to Germany 
in the 1990s – particularly ethnic Germans – were also 
surveyed by means of a new sample.
Survey respondents are considered to have a party iden-
tification when they answer “yes” to the following SOEP 
question item: “Many people in Germany lean towards one 
party in the long term, even if they occasionally vote for 
another party. Do you lean towards a particular party?” 
Only individuals who indicated allegiance to a specific par-
ty were included in our analysis of party preferences.
A number of items in the SOEP questionnaire address the 
topic of national origin. In this connection, for example, 
individuals with a Turkish immigrant background can be 
born in Turkey or Germany. If Germany is the place of 
birth, then the nationality of the individual – or former 
nationality, if he or she has been naturalized – is used as 
a criterion to identify migration background. Information 
about the respondee’s parents – if they have also partici-
pated in the survey – is also used. In this way, individuals 
with migration background can possess either German 
or foreign citizenship. The “second-generation” is born in 
Germany and has parents who are immigrants. Individuals 
of Spanish, Greek, Portuguese, or Italian origin are desig-
nated as originating from an “EU recruitment country.” 
A multinomial regression model was estimated in order 
to explain party identification. This regression model was 
used to calculate the chance that an individual identifies 
with a specific party. The SPD was used as the reference 
category. In this model, marginal effects are calculated 
in order to interpret the estimated coefficients. These 
effects show how variations in individual factors (e.g. 
country of origin) impact the expected likelihood that 
the dependent variable will deliver a particular result. 
Individuals without migration background are the refer-
ence category for all other groups. 
1 See Wagner, G. G. et al.: The Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP): Mul-
tidisziplinäres Haushaltspanel und Kohortenstudie für Deutschland – 
Eine Einführung (für neue Datennutzer) mit einem Ausblick (für erfah-
rene Anwender). In: AStA Wirtschafts- und Sozialstatistisches Archiv, 
vol. 2, book 4, 2008, 301–328.
to Germany and claimed citizenship under the so-
called “Federal Expellee Law” (depending on the 
date of immigration, these immigrants are known 
either as Aussiedler or Spätaussiedler); as well as 
(2) naturalized persons of Turkish descent. Since 
the reform of Germany’s citizenship laws in 2001– 
reforms which provided for, among other things, 
the reduction of the minimum period of residence 
for naturalization from 15 to 8 years—an average 
of more than 100,000 people have been naturalized 
annually.4 Nevertheless, Germany is still one of 
the few OECD countries in which only a minority 
of individuals with a migration background pos-
sess citizenship.5 A situation thus persists in which 
large numbers of immigrants, many of whom have 
been living in Germany for decades, are excluded 
from full political participation. In many cases, 
the adult children of immigrants lack citizenship 
4  Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge: Migrationsbericht 2007.
5    OECD:  Children  of  Immigrants  in  the  Labour  Market  of  EU  and 
OECD  Countries:  An  Overview.  Paris  2009,  www.oecd.org/datao-
ecd/39/32/43880918.pdf.
Figure 1







0 246 8 10
Number of years since immigration
Source: SOEP.   DIW Berlin 2009The Party Identification of Germany’s Immigrant Population
22 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 4/2010
and are unable to vote, despite having been born 
in Germany.
Immigrant Party Identification:  
A Question of Time
Before developing an affinity for a specific political 
party, immigrants must first become acquainted with 
the political issues in their new country of residence. 
Accordingly, the SOEP-based results indicate that 
individuals with a migration background indicate 
less frequently than other survey participants that 
they have supported a certain political party in 
Germany for a long period of time.6 In the annual 
SOEP survey results from the 1980s, some 45% of 
individuals with a migrant background indicated an 
identification to a political party; by contrast, this fig-
ure was 65% among non-immigrant citizens. Since 
the 1980s, the number of survey participants who 
indicate a party identification has steadily fallen, a 
phenomenon also prevalent in many other Western 
countries.7 A decline of 10 percentage points has 
been witnessed among individuals with a migration 
background, and 15 percentage points among those 
without migration background. However, on the 
basis of the persistent and more or less stable gap 
between the two groups, one cannot conclude that 
immigrants and their offspring have not increased 
their political awareness or engagement. This is 
because many new immigrants arrive each year in 
Germany who, lacking knowledge of Germany’s 
party system, initially have no party identification. 
Figure 1 displays the percentage of immigrants in-
dicating a party identification in relation to their 
years of residence in Germany, according to SOEP 
survey results. After ten years of residence, approxi-
mately half of all survey participants indicate a party 
identification.
Party Identification Stable Over 
Generations
Post-war Germany has experienced two major 
waves of immigration. Beginning in the mid-1950s, 
German companies recruited workers on a massive 
scale from Turkey, Yugoslavia, Spain, Italy, Greece, 
and Portugal. Later, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
many individuals of German descent immigrated to 
Germany (so-called Spätaussiedler). In addition, 
prior to the tightening of Germany’s asylum laws 
in 1993, a large number of asylum seekers came to 
6  In this respect and elsewhere, the SOEP survey data encompasses both 
naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants.
7  Dalton, R., Wattenberg, M. P. (ed.): Parties without Partisans: Political 
Change in Advanced Industrial Societies. Oxford 2000.
Germany, including many seeking to escape the war 
in Yugoslavia. Germany’s immigrants are thus quite 
heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity and culture, a 
fact that is reflected in the evolving party prefer-
ences of the immigrant population. 
Until the end of the 1980s, the families of so-
called “guest workers” constituted the majority of 
Germany’s immigrant population. Some 70% tended 
to support the SPD. In the early 1990s, many ethnic 
Germans immigrated to Germany; these immigrants, 
by contrast, primarily supported the CDU/CSU. 
This has led immigrant support to be divided al-
most equally between the two main parties since the 
1990s (see Figure 2). At present, political support 
among individuals with a migration background 
who indicate they have a party identification is di-
vided roughly equally among the SPD and CDU/
CSU at 40%. An identification with smaller parties 
is less prevalent among individuals with a migration 
background than among natives. This is particularly 
true with regard to support for the FDP (Germany’s 
libertarian party) and “Die Linke” (a left party). 
A more nuanced assessment of party allegiances 
among Germany’s immigrant population shows 
that survey participants from former “recruitment 
countries” still have a clear preference for the 
SPD. However, of individuals indicating a party 
identification in this group of immigrants, the per-
centage supporting the SPD has fallen since the 
1980s to 65%, down from 75%. At the same time, 
among ethnic German immigrants (Aussiedler and 
Spätaussiedler), 75% preferred the CDU/CSU in the 
1990s; this number has fallen since then to 65% (see 
Figure 2
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Figure 3). Only among their key constituencies do 
Germany’s mainstream parties otherwise enjoy such 
high levels of support. The remaining immigrant 
groups are extremely heterogeneous in terms of their 
countries of origin and reasons for immigration. Of 
those who indicate a party identification, the major-
ity (44% in 2000-2008) support the CDU/CSU.
On the whole, the immigrants’ offspring tend to 
have the same party identification as their parents 
(see Table). For example, 69% of first-generation 
Turkish immigrants with a party identification sup-
port the SPD; among the second generation, this 
figure is 73%. In this connection, it is noteworthy 
that immigrants’ offspring show higher levels of 
support for “B90/Die Grünen” (Germany’s green 
party alliance) than first-generation immigrants. The 
percentage of immigrants who support Germany’s 
green party rises between the first and second 
generation from 8% to 10% among individuals of 
Turkish descent; from 4% to 10% among those of 
Yugoslavian descent; and from 3% to 17% among 
individuals from the EU “recruitment countries” 
(Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece). It is not clear at 
present, however, whether this discrepancy reflects 
a generational gap per se or merely age differences. 
Yet regardless of generational affiliation, Germany’s 
green party enjoys particularly high support (20%) 
among immigrants from other Western countries.
Migration Background Strong 
Determinant of Party Preferences
Germany’s political landscape is characterized 
by stable lines of dispute; the mainstream politi-
cal parties have advocated consistent positions on 
dominant issues for decades. Thus, citizens with a 
religious identification and the self-employed tradi-
tionally tend to support the CDU/CSU. By contrast, 
employees without a strong religious identification 
support the SPD, and, with increasing frequency, 
“Die Linke.”8 Highly educated individuals with 
weak religious ties have shown stable support for 
“B90/Die Grünen.” The positions taken by each 
party within the political spectrum reflect the pref-
erences of their constituencies. For individuals 
without migration background, the SOEP surveys 
conducted in recent years confirm the contours of 
party loyalty described here.
Party identifications are distributed among survey 
participants with and without migration background 
in a very similar fashion.9 When one combines all 
SOEP-respondents together regardless of national 
origin and sorts them according to education level, 
8  Kroh, M., Siedler, T.: Die Anhänger der “Linken”: Rückhalt quer durch 
alle Einkommensschichten. DIW Berlin Wochenbericht 41/2008 (Ger-
man version).
9  Zuckerman, A., Kroh, M.: The Social Logic of Bounded Partisanship 
in Germany: A Comparison of West Germans, East Germans, and Immi-
grants. Comparative European Politics 4, 2006, 65–93.
Table 
Party Identification, Average Support in 2000-20081
Support in percent among all individuals with a party identification
SPD CDU/CSU FDP B90/ Die Grünen PDS/ Die Linke
Persons with migration background 39 41 4 9 5
Persons without migration background
Ethnic German immigrants2 24 65 3 4 4
Turkey 70 13 2 9 3
1st generation 69 14 1 8 3
2nd generation 73 8 2 10 1
(Former) Yugoslavia 63 23 2 5 3
1st generation 68 22 1 4 3
2nd generation 39 27 11 10 7
EU recruitment countries 64 20 3 8 2
1st generation 68 22 3 3 3
2nd generation 55 18 2 17 2
Other Western countries 37 35 4 20 1
1st generation 39 33 4 20 1
2nd generation 33 38 5 19 1
Other non-Western countries 38 47 2 5 5
1st generation 38 48 2 5 4
2nd generation 35 43 5 9 8
1   In contrast to voter intention, party identification measures long-term support to a specific party. The long-term support enjoyed by Germany’s 
major parties is generally higher than the support measured in surveys that query vote intentions for an upcoming election. In voter intention 
surveys, smaller parties profit overproportionally from voters who are not committed to a single party.
2   Number of observations too small for a meaningful measurement of second generation preferences.
Source: SOEP. DIW Berlin 2009The Party Identification of Germany’s Immigrant Population
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professional status, or political orientation on a 
left-right scale, one finds that there are often only 
minimal differences between respondents with and 
without migration background in terms of their po-
litical preferences. For example, the percentage of 
Catholics who support the CDU/CSU is 59% among 
those without an immigrant background and 52% 
among those with an immigrant background. The 
percentage of college graduates who support “B90/
Die Grünen” is 14% among those without migration 
background and 17% among those with migration 
background. Among individuals with  migration 
background, only “Die Linke/PDS” appears to be 
relatively unattractive—even for those immigrants 
who are unemployed.10 
10  As the party alliance “Die Linke/PDS” advocates increasing unem-
ployment benefits, one might initially predict to see a higher level of sup-
port among unemployed immigrants.
Yet among those with migration background, there is 
relatively strong heterogeneity in party preferences 
according to country of origin. Varying reasons for 
emigrating and alternate levels of success in inte-
grating in German society as well as divergent social 
positions are all possible factors that might explain 
this heterogeneity. For example, immigrants from the 
former “recruitment countries” work with particular 
frequency in industrial manufacturing, and workers 
in such professions are a traditional SPD constituen-
Figure 4
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cy.11 This observation also applies to the offspring of 
Turkish immigrants.12 Nevertheless, the data show 
that variations in party identification according to 
country of origin for the most part remain when 
one controls for demographic and regional charac-
teristics (age, gender, city size, region) in addition 
to social factors (occupational status, household 
income, education level), basic political outlook 
(left-right orientation, values, importance attached 
to various issues), union membership and religious 
affiliation (Catholic: yes/no). Approximately 39% 
of those surveyed without migration background 
indicated an allegiance to the SPD in 2000-2008. 
Among individuals with migration background from 
the traditional “guest-worker” countries, this figure 
is about 18 percentage points higher (see Figure 4). 
When one controls for social factors and basic politi-
cal orientations, this discrepancy declines slightly 
to 16 percentage points. Hence, social and political 
factors only account for two percentage points of 
the divergent level of support for the SPD witnessed 
between individuals without migration background 
and respondents from former recruitment countries. 
A similar picture emerges when one examines eth-
nic Germans: Whereas 41% of native respondents 
support the CDU/CSU, this figure is 18 percentage 
points higher among ethnic Germans. When one 
controls for social factors and basic political orien-
tations, the level of support is only one percentage 
point lower.
Solely the comparatively low level of support for 
“B90/Die Grünen” among individuals with migra-
tion background is explained to large extent by per-
sonal factors. Among survey participants without 
migration background who declared a party identifi-
cation, approximately 9% voiced support for “B90/
Die Grünen.” Support for this party is approximately 
4 percentage points lower among immigrants from 
former “recruitment countries” and their offspring. 
However, if one views the particular social position 
of this group—a group which is not a traditional 
constituency of “B90/Die Grünen”—then the gap 
separating survey participants with and without 
migration background shrinks to just over one per-
centage point.
The fact that the considerable differences in party 
identification among individuals with migration 
background can only be explained to a minimal 
11  Wüst, A.: Eingebürgerte als Wähler: Erkenntnisse aus der Bundesre-
publik Deutschland. Wiener Hefte—Migration und Integration in Theo-
rie und Praxis, Vol 1, Nr. 1, 2003, 113–126.
12  Tucci, I., Groh-Samberg, O.: Das enttäuschte Versprechen der Inte-
gration: Migrantennachkommen in Frankreich und Deutschland. Schwei-
zerische Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Vol. 34, Nr. 2, 2008, 307–333. Tucci, 
I.: Lebenssituation von Migranten und deren Nachkommen in Deutsch-
land.  In:  Datenreport  2008.  Ein  Sozialbericht  für  die  Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland.  Statistisches  Bundesamt,  GESIS-ZUMA  und  WZB  (ed.), 
2008, 200–207.
degree by social position and basic political orienta-
tions suggests that the political positions advocated 
by parties with regard to immigration and integra-
tion policies play an influential role.13 In this way, it 
would appear that personal experiences with regard 
to immigration and integration are an important 
factor for the party identification of immigrants and 
their offspring.
Naturalization Does Not Affect 
Relative Strength of Parties in the 
Electorate
Despite the easing of naturalization laws in 2001, 
requirements in Germany to obtain citizenship 
remain  comparatively  restrictive.14 According 
to the German Federal Statistical Office’s 2007 
Microzensus, some five million people born in 
Germany have migration background; a third of 
this number possess foreign citizenship. Among 
native-born adults with immigrant parents, 42% of 
20-to-25 year olds possess foreign citizenship. This 
figure rises to 64% among 25-to-35 year olds and to 
70% among 35-to-45 year olds.15 A relatively large 
number of the second generation is thus excluded 
from the political process. 
In countries such as the US and France, the exten-
sion of citizenship to children born domestically is a 
long-standing practice. If citizenship—and, in turn, 
voting rights—were granted to all persons born in 
Germany, the relative levels of support enjoyed by 
each political party would hardly change. A pro-
jection based on SOEP data shows that the SPD 
would gain 0.1 percentage points at the expense of 
the CDU/CSU.
Furthermore, there are some 8.3 million first-gener-
ation immigrants who have been living in Germany 
for more than eight years. Of this number, three 
million are foreign citizens. In a second scenario, 
we investigated what would happen if citizenship 
and voting rights were granted to all foreigners with 
a term of residence longer than eight years. In this 
scenario, as well, the effects on party support are 
minimal: The SPD would gain one percentage point, 
13  Wüst, A.: Das Wahlverhalten eingebürgerter Personen in Deutsch-
land. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 52, 2003, 29–38.
14  Germany’s cititzenship laws were reformed such that all children 
born in Germany on or subsequent to January 1, 2000, automatically re-
ceive German citizenship. Other changes were also introduced, including 
the rules concerning applying for citizenship. According to these rules, all 
foreign nationals must: 1) have lived in Germany regularly and legally for 
a minimum of eight years; 2) support themselves independently, without 
receiving welfare; 3) possess sufficient knowledge of the German langu-
age; 4) not have been committed of a felony; 5) avow their support for 
Germany’s laws and democratic principles; and 5) renounce their former 
citizenship. 
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while the CDU/CSU would lose half a percentage point. Thus, in spite of the hopes 
and fears entertained by Germany’s various parties, modified naturalization laws 
or changing naturalization trends would have only little impact on the relative 
strength of each party.
Conclusion         
The longer an immigrant has been living in Germany, the greater the chances he 
or she identifies with a particular political party. Nearly 70% of immigrants with a 
party identification from former “recruitment countries” tend to support the SPD. 
This party identification is relatively stable across generations, even if immigrants’ 
offspring tend to support “B90/Die Grünen” with somewhat greater frequency. By 
contrast, ethnic Germans display a clear preference for the CDU/CSU. 
The differences between immigrant groups are not determined by disparities in social 
position or basic political outlook. Rather, a migrant background unto itself—and the 
experiences and circumstances associated with it—make an independent contribution 
to explaining the political preferences of immigrants and their children.
The effort to promote dialog and cooperation between immigrants and the so-called 
“majority”—a key goal of Germany’s National Integration Plan—is contingent 
upon the political participation of individuals with migration background.16 This, 
in turn, requires that immigrants and their children acquire German citizenship so 
that they can vote and take a seat at the table of democratic society. The extension 
of citizenship to foreign residents should be viewed by the political parties as an 
opportunity. The easing of naturalization laws would send a clear signal of open-
ness and acceptance, and encourage long-standing foreign residents to become full 
members of German society. 
16  Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration, Der Nationale Integrationsplan, 
2007, www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Publikation/IB/Anlagen/nationaler-integrationsplan,property=pub
licationFile.pdf.